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Abstract
Global climate change and fuel security risks have encouraged international and regional adoption of pollution/carbon
taxes. A major portion of such policy interventions is directed at the electric power industry with taxes applied according to
the type of fuel used by the power generators in their power plants. This paper proposes an electric power supply chain
network model that captures the behavior of power generators faced with a portfolio of power plant options and subject
to pollution taxes. We demonstrate that this general model can be reformulated as a transportation network equilibrium
model with elastic demands and qualitatively analyzed and solved as such. The connections between these two diﬀerent
modeling schemas is done through ﬁnite-dimensional variational inequality theory. The numerical examples illustrate
how changes in the pollution/carbon taxes aﬀect the equilibrium electric power supply chain network production outputs,
the transactions between the various decision-makers the demand market prices, as well as the total amount of carbon
emissions generated.
Ó 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
The ubiquity of electricity in the industrialized world obscures the scale, impacts, and ongoing economic
transformation of this vital sector. In modern societies there are few goods or services that do not depend
*
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directly on electricity. In the past half-century, the total annual electricity use in the US alone has grown every
year but two. Other statistics of scale include the US electrical industry’s more than half a trillion dollars of net
assets, its $220 billion in annual sales, and its consumption of almost 40% of domestic primary energy (coal,
natural gas, uranium, and oil), or approximately 40 quadrillion BTU (see Edison Electric Institute, 2000;
Energy Information Administration, 2000, 2005). In addition to the great economic and industrial impacts
of electric power, the heavy reliance on fossil fuel sources before conversion to electricity has had concomitantly a large environmental impact. Of the total US emissions of carbon dioxide and nitrous oxide, more than
a third arises from generating electricity. With the accumulating evidence of global warming, any policy aimed
at mitigating the immense risks of unstable climate must directly address the electricity industry (Poterba,
1993; Cline, 1992).
Currently, market prices for energy fail to signal its many external costs (e.g., regional and global pollution)
and also hide market distortions such as subsidies. In order to address such market failures in energy, a powerful policy is that of pollution taxes, speciﬁcally, carbon taxes (Baranzini et al., 2000), and encouraging generation from renewable sources (e.g., solar power and wind power, Painuly, 2001) through the use of credits
(e.g., tradable green certiﬁcates). The latter policy instrument is now deployed in several states in the US, as
well as in the European Union (see RECS, 1999; Schaeﬀer et al., 1999).
Hence, the modeling of the options available to power generators in terms of their power plant selection
(and associated fuel) plus environmental taxes is of great interest in the electric power industry. A suitable
model, however, must also be able to accommodate changing economic behavior due to the deregulation
of the electric power industry, from the historic norm of highly regulated, vertically integrated utilities to a
new environment of competition between the major players, such as power generators, suppliers, transmission
service providers, and consumers. For additional background on the electric power industry (see Casazza and
Delea, 2003; Singh, 1999; Zaccour, 1998).
2. The electric power supply chain network model with power plants and pollution taxes
In this section we develop the electric power supply chain network model that includes power plants as well
as pollution taxes. We consider G power generators (or gencos), each of which generally owns and operates M
power plants. Each power plant may use a diﬀerent primary energy fuel (i.e., coal, natural gas, uranium, oil,
sun, wind, etc.) and we can expect that each may have diﬀerent associated costs. Furthermore, as we shall illuminate, subsequently, each plant will have associated costs that fully reﬂect policy objectives. For example, a
coal plant and a natural gas plant, even if they have identical functions for electric power production may have
very diﬀerent carbon or pollution taxes, as is expected, given their markedly diﬀerent environmental impacts
(burning coal being far dirtier environmentally than burning natural gas). There are also S power suppliers, T
transmission service providers, and K consumer markets, as depicted in Fig. 1. The majority of the needed
notation is given in Table 1. An equilibrium solution is denoted by ‘‘*’’. All vectors are assumed to be column
vectors, except where noted otherwise.
The top tiered nodes in the electric power supply chain network in Fig. 1, enumerated by 1, . . . , g . . . , G,
represent the G electric power generators, who are the decision-makers who own and operate the electric
power generating facilities or power plants denoted by the second tier of nodes in the network. The gencos
produce electric power using the diﬀerent power plants and sell to the power suppliers in the third tier. Node
gm in the second tier corresponds to genco g’s power plant m, with the second tier of nodes enumerated as:
11, . . . , GM. We assume that each electric power generator seeks to determine his optimal production portfolio across his power plants and his sales allocations of the electric power to the suppliers in order to maximize
his own proﬁt.
Power suppliers, which are represented by the third tiered nodes in Fig. 1, function as intermediaries. The
nodes corresponding to the power suppliers are enumerated as: 1, . . . , s, . . . , S with node s corresponding to
supplier s. They purchase electric power from the power generators and are aware as to the types of power
plants used by the generators. They also sell the electric power to the consumers at the diﬀerent demand markets. We assume that the power suppliers compete with one another in a noncooperative manner. However,
the suppliers do not physically possess electric power at any stage of the supplying process; they only hold and
trade the right for the electric power.

Fig. 1. The electric power supply chain network.
Table 1
Notation for the electric power supply chain network model
Notation

Deﬁnition

qgm
qm
q
Q1

Quantity of electricity produced by generator g using power plant m, where g = 1, . . . , G; m = 1, . . . , M
G-dimensional vector of electric power generated by the gencos using power plant m with components: g1m, . . . , gGm
GM-dimensional vector of all the electric power outputs generated by the gencos at the power plants
GMS-dimensional vector of electric power ﬂows between the power plants of the power generators and the
power suppliers with component gms denoted by qgms
STK-dimensional vector of power ﬂows between suppliers and demand markets with component stk denoted
by qtsk and denoting the ﬂow between supplier s and demand market k via transmission provider t
K-dimensional vector of market demands with component k denoted by dk
Power generating cost function of power generator g using power plant m with marginal power generating cost
of
with respect to qgm denoted by oqgm
gm
Transaction cost incurred by power generator g using power plant m in transacting with power supplier s with
oc ðqgms Þ
marginal transaction cost denoted by gms
oqgms
Unit tax associated with carbon emissions by genco g using power plant m
Amount of carbon emitted by genco g using power plant m per unit of electric power produced
S-dimensional vector
the power suppliers’ supplies of the electric power with component s denoted
P of
PM
by hs, with hs  G
g¼1
m¼1 qgms
ocs
Operating cost of power supplier s with marginal operating cost with respect to hs denoted by oh
and the marginal
s

Q2
d
fgm(qm)
cgms(qgms)
sgm
egm
h
cs(h)  cs(Q1)

operating cost with respect to qgms denoted by
ctsk ðqtsk Þ

ocs ðQ1 Þ
oqgms

Transaction cost incurred by power supplier s in transacting with demand market k via transmission
provider t with marginal transaction cost with respect to qtsk denoted by

ĉgms(qgms)

Transaction cost incurred by power supplier s in transacting with power generator g for power generated
o^c

^ctsk ðQ2 Þ
q3k(d)

octsk ðqtsk Þ
oqtsk

ðq

Þ

gms
by plant m with marginal transaction cost denoted by gms
oqgms
Unit transaction cost incurred by consumers at demand market k in transacting with power
supplier s via transmission provider t
Demand market price function at demand market k

The bottom tiered nodes in Fig. 1 represent the demand markets, which can be distinguished from one
another by their geographic locations or the type of associated consumers such as whether they correspond,
for example, to businesses or to households. There are K bottom-tiered nodes with node k corresponding to
demand market k.

A transmission service is necessary for the physical delivery of electric power from the power generators to
the points of consumption. The transmission service providers are the entities who own and operate the electric power transmission and distribution systems, and distribute electric power from power generators to the
consumption markets. However, since these transmission service providers do not make decisions such as to
where or from whom the electric power will be delivered, they are not explicitly represented by nodes in this
network model. We, instead, as suggested by Nagurney and Matsypura (2004), model them as diﬀerent
modes of transaction corresponding to the parallel links connecting a given supplier node to a given demand
market node in Fig. 1. Hence, an implicit assumption is that the power suppliers need to cover the direct cost
and decide which transmission service providers should be used and how much electric power should be delivered. The structure of the network in Fig. 1 guarantees that the conservation of ﬂow equations associated with
the electric power production and distribution are satisﬁed. The ﬂows on the links joining the genco nodes in
Fig. 1 to the power plant nodes are respectively: q11, . . . , qgm, . . . , qGM; the ﬂows on the links from the power
plant nodes to the supplier nodes are given, respectively, by the components of the vector Q1, whereas the
ﬂows on the links joining the supplier nodes with the demand markets are given by the respective components
of the vector: Q2.
Of course, if a particular genco does not own M power plants, then the corresponding links (and nodes) can
just be removed from the electric supply chain network in Fig. 1 and the notation reduced accordingly.
We now describe the behavior of the electric power generators, the suppliers, and the consumers at the
demand markets. We then state the equilibrium conditions of the electric power supply chain network and
provide the variational inequality formulation.
2.1. The behavior of the power generators and their optimality conditions
We assume that egm, g = 1, . . . , G; m = 1, . . . , M, denotes the carbon emissions generated per unit of electric power produced by genco g using its power plant m. Hence, the total amount of carbon emissions associated with genco g and power plant m is egmqgm.
Let q1gms denote the unit price charged by power generator g for the transaction with power supplier s for
power produced at plant m. q1gms is an endogenous variable and can be determined once the complete electric
power supply chain network equilibrium model is solved. Since we have assumed that each individual power
generator is a proﬁt-maximizer, the optimization problem of power generator g can be expressed as follows:
Maximize

M X
S
X

q1gms qgms 

m¼1 s¼1

subject to:

S
X

M
X

fgm ðqm Þ 

m¼1

qgms ¼ qgm ;

M X
S
X
m¼1 s¼1

m ¼ 1; . . . ; M;

cgms ðqgms Þ 

M
X

sgm egm qgm

ð1Þ

m¼1

ð2Þ

s¼1

qgms P 0;

m ¼ 1; . . . ; M; s ¼ 1; . . . ; S.

ð3Þ

The ﬁrst term in the objective function (1) represents the revenue and the next two terms represent the power
generation cost and transaction costs, respectively. The last term in (1) denotes the total payout in pollution
taxes by the genco based on the total carbon pollution emitted. We note that Nagurney and Toyasaki (2003)
assumed that pollution generated associated with producers in a supply chain had a similar structure, although
in that paper no environmental policies in the form of pollution taxes were considered. Conservation of ﬂow
equation (2) states that the amount of power generated at a particular power plant (and corresponding to a
particular genco) is equal to the electric power transacted by the genco from that power plant with all the suppliers and this holds for each of the power plants.
Note that, according to the power generation cost functions fgm(qm), g = 1, . . . , G; m = 1, . . . , M, the cost
depends not only on the speciﬁc power plant’s output using the particular plant-type but may also on the outputs of the other power generators using the same power plant-type. This is reasonable due to competition for
the resources that are used in the various electric power plant production processes. Of course, this model contains, as a special case, power generating cost functions such that fgm(qgm), g = 1, . . . , G; m = 1, . . . , M, in
which case the power generating cost associated with a power generator and a power plant depends only upon

the output of the generator’s particular power plant. Hence, in this case, the model would assume perfect competition in the input markets. It is important to note that the proposed modeling framework can handle either
imperfect or perfect competition in the input markets.
We assume that the generating cost and the transaction cost functions for each power generator are continuously diﬀerentiable and convex, and that the power generators compete in a noncooperative manner in the
sense of Nash (1950, 1951). The optimality conditions for all power generators simultaneously, under the
above assumptions (Gabay and Moulin, 1980; Bazaraa et al., 1993; Bertsekas and Tsitsiklis, 1989; Nagurney,
1993), coincide with the solution of the following variational inequality: determine ðq ; Q1 Þ 2 K1 satisfying
"
#
"
#
G X
M
G X
M X
S
X
X
ocgms ðqgms Þ
ofgm ðqm Þ


þ sgm egm  ½qgm  qgm  þ
 q1gms  ½qgms  qgms 
oq
oq
gm
gms
g¼1 m¼1
g¼1 m¼1 s¼1
P0

8ðq; Q1 Þ 2 K1 ;

ð4Þ

þGMS
where K1  fðq; Q1 Þ j ðq; Q1 Þ 2 RGM
and (2) holdsg.
þ

2.2. The behavior of power suppliers and their optimality conditions
The power suppliers, such as the power marketers, traders, and brokers, in turn, are involved in transactions both with the power generators and with the consumers at demand markets through the transmission
service providers.
Since electric power cannot be stored, it is reasonable to assume that the total amount of electricity sold by
a power supplier is equal to the total electric power that he purchased from the generators and produced via
the diﬀerent power plants available to the generators. This assumption can be expressed as the following conservation of ﬂow equations:
K X
T
X
k¼1

qtsk ¼

t¼1

G X
M
X

qgms ;

s ¼ 1; . . . ; S.

ð5Þ

g¼1 m¼1

Let qt
2sk denote the price charged by power supplier s to demand market k via transmission service provider t.
This price is determined endogenously in the model once the entire network equilibrium problem is solved. As
noted above, it is assumed that each power supplier seeks to maximize his own proﬁt. Hence the optimization
problem faced by supplier s may be expressed as follows:
Maximize

K X
T
X
k¼1

subject to:

G X
M
X

t¼1

K X
T
X
k¼1

1
t
qt
2sk qsk  cs ðQ Þ 

g¼1 m¼1

qtsk ¼

t¼1

qgms P 0;
qtsk P 0;

q1gms qgms 

G X
M
X

qgms ;

G X
M
X
g¼1 m¼1

^cgms ðqgms Þ 

K X
T
X
k¼1

ctsk ðqtsk Þ

ð6Þ

t¼1

ð7Þ

g¼1 m¼1

g ¼ 1; . . . ; G; m ¼ 1; . . . ; M;
k ¼ 1; . . . ; K; t ¼ 1; . . . ; T .

ð8Þ
ð9Þ

The ﬁrst term in (6) denotes the revenue of supplier s; the second term denotes the operating cost of the supplier;
the third term denotes the payments for the electric power to the various gencos, and the ﬁnal two terms represent
the various transaction costs. Note that here we have assumed imperfect competition in terms of the handling
cost but, of course, if the handling cost functions cs, s = 1, . . . , S, depend only on the electric power handled
by s (and not also on the power handled by the other suppliers), then the dependence of these functions on Q1
can be simpliﬁed accordingly (and this is a special case of the model). The latter would reﬂect perfect competition.
We assume that the transaction costs and the operating costs (6) are all continuously diﬀerentiable and convex, and that the power suppliers compete in a noncooperative manner. Hence, the optimality conditions for
all suppliers, simultaneously, under the above assumptions (Dafermos and Nagurney, 1987; Nagurney et al.,
2002; Nagurney and Matsypura, 2004), can be expressed as the following variational inequality: determine
ðQ2 ; Q1 Þ 2 K2 such that

"
#

S X
K X
T  t
G X
M X
S
X
X
ocsk ðqt
ocs ðQ1 Þ o^cgms ðqgms Þ
t
t
t

sk Þ
 q2sk  ½qsk  qsk  þ
þ
þ q1gms
oqgms
oqtsk
oqgms
s¼1 k¼1 t¼1
g¼1 m¼1 s¼1
 ½qgms  qgms  P 0
2

2

1

2

8ðQ2 ; Q1 Þ 2 K2 ;

ð10Þ

1

where K  fðQ ; Q Þ j ðQ ; Q Þ 2 RSTKþGMS
and holdsg.
þ
In addition, for notational convenience, we let
G X
M
X

hs 

qgms ;

s ¼ 1; . . . ; S.

ð11Þ

g¼1 m¼1

As deﬁned in Table 1, the operating cost of power supplier s, cs, is a function of the total electricity inﬂows
to the power supplier, that is:
cs ðhÞ  cs ðQ1 Þ;

s ¼ 1; . . . ; S.

ð12Þ

Hence, his marginal cost with respect to hs is equal to the marginal cost with respect to qgms:
ocs ðhÞ ocs ðQ1 Þ

;
ohs
oqgms

s ¼ 1; . . . ; S; m ¼ 1; . . . ; M.

ð13Þ

After the substitution of (11) and (13) into (10), and algebraic simpliﬁcation, we obtain a variational
inequality equivalent to (10), as follows: determine ðh ; Q2 ; Q1 Þ 2 K3 such that
"
#


S
S X
K X
T  t
G X
M X
S
t
X
X
X
o^
c
ðq
Þ
ocs ðh Þ
oc
ðq
Þ
gms
gms
t
t
sk sk
 ½hs  hs  þ
 qt
þ q1gms
2sk  ½qsk  qsk  þ
oqgms
ohs
oqtsk
s¼1
s¼1 k¼1 t¼1
g¼1 m¼1 s¼1
 ½qgms  qgms  P 0

8ðh; Q1 ; Q2 ; Þ 2 K3 ;
Sð1þTKþGMÞ

where K3  fðh; Q2 ; Q1 Þ j ðh; Q2 ; Q1 Þ 2 Rþ

ð14Þ
and (7) and (11) holdg.

2.3. Equilibrium conditions for the demand markets
At each demand market k the following conservation of ﬂow equation must be satisﬁed:
dk ¼

S X
T
X
s¼1

qtsk ;

k ¼ 1; . . . ; K.

ð15Þ

t¼1

Since the demand market price functions are given (instead of the demand functions as was the case in Nagurney and Matsypura, 2004), the market equilibrium conditions at demand market k take the form: for each
power supplier s, s = 1, . . . , S, and transaction mode t, t = 1, . . . , T,

¼ q3k ðd  Þ if qt
sk > 0;
2
t
t
ð16Þ
q2sk þ ^csk ðQ Þ

P q3k ðd Þ if qt
sk ¼ 0.
The interpretation of conditions (16) is as follows: consumers at a demand market will purchase power
from a supplier via a transmission provider, provided that the purchase price plus the unit transaction cost
is equal to the price that the consumers are willing to pay at that demand market. If the purchase price plus
the unit transaction cost exceeds the price the consumers are willing to pay, then there will be no transaction
between that supplier and demand market via that transmission provider. The equivalent variational inequality takes the form: determine ðQ2 ; d  Þ 2 K4 , such that
S X
K X
T
X
s¼1

k¼1

½qt
ctsk ðQ2 Þ  ½qtsk  qt
2sk þ ^
sk  

t¼1

K
X

q3k ðd  Þ  ½d k  d k  P 0

k¼1
KðST þ1Þ

where K4  fðQ2 ; dÞ j ðQ2 ; dÞ 2 Rþ

and (15) holds}.

8ðQ2 ; dÞ 2 K4 ;

ð17Þ

2.4. The equilibrium conditions for the electric power supply chain network
In equilibrium, the optimality conditions for all the power generators, the optimality conditions for all the
power suppliers, and the equilibrium conditions for all the demand markets must be simultaneously satisﬁed
so that no decision-maker has any incentive to alter his transactions. We now formally state the equilibrium
conditions for the entire electric power supply chain network.
Deﬁnition 1 (Electric power supply chain network equilibrium). The equilibrium state of the electric power
supply chain network with power plants and pollution taxes is one where the electric power ﬂows between the
tiers of the network coincide and the electric power ﬂows satisfy the sum of conditions (4), (14), and (17).
We now state and prove:
Theorem 1 (Variational inequality formulation of the electric power supply chain network equilibrium). The
equilibrium conditions governing the electric power supply chain network according to Definition 1 coincide with
the solution of the variational inequality given by: determine ðq ; h ; Q1 ; Q2 ; d  Þ 2 K5 satisfying:
"
#
G X
M
S
X
X
ofgm ðqm Þ
ocs ðh Þ
þ sgm egm  ½qgm  qgm  þ
oqgm
ohs
g¼1 m¼1
s¼1
"
#

G X
M X
S
S X
K X
T  t
X
X
ocgms ðqgms Þ o^cgms ðqgms Þ
ocsk ðqt

2
t
sk Þ
^
 ½hs  hs  þ
þ
þ
c
ðQ
Þ
 ½qgms  qgms  þ
sk
oqgms
oqgms
oqtsk
g¼1 m¼1 s¼1
s¼1 k¼1 t¼1
 ½qtsk  qt
sk  

K
X

q3k ðd  Þ  ½d k  d k  P 0

8ðq; h; Q1 ; Q2 ; dÞ 2 K5 ;

ð18Þ

k¼1

where
K5  fðq; h; Q1 ; Q2 ; dÞ j ðq; h; Q1 ; Q2 ; dÞ 2 RþGMþSþGMSþTSKþK and (2), (5), (11), and (15) holdg.
Proof. We ﬁrst prove that an equilibrium according to Deﬁnition 1 coincides with the solution of variational
inequality (18). Indeed, summation of (4), (14), and (17), after algebraic simpliﬁcations, yields (18).
We now prove the converse, that is, a solution to variational inequality (18) satisﬁes the sum of conditions
(4), (14), and (17), and is, therefore, an electric power supply chain network equilibrium pattern according to
Deﬁnition 1.
First, we add the term q1gms  q1gms to the ﬁrst term in the third summand expression in (18). Then, we add
t
the term qt
2sk  q2sk to the ﬁrst term in the fourth summand expression in (18). Since these terms are all equal
to zero, they do not change (18). Hence, we obtain the following inequality:
"
#
G X
M
S
G X
M
X
X
X
ofgm ðqm Þ
ocs ðh Þ
þ sgm egm  ½qgm  qgm  þ
 ½hs  hs  þ
oqgm
ohs
g¼1 m¼1
s¼1
g¼1 m¼1
"
#
S
S X
K
X
X
ocgms ðqgms Þ o^cgms ðqgms Þ

þ
þ q1gms  q1gms  ½qgms  qgms  þ
oqgms
oqgms
s¼1
s¼1 k¼1


T
K
X
X
octsk ðqt
t
t
t
t
sk Þ

þ ^ctsk ðqt
q3k ðd  Þ  ½d k  d k  P 0
sk Þ þ q2sk  q2sk  ½qsk  qsk  
t
oqsk
t¼1
k¼1
8ðq; h; Q1 ; Q2 ; dÞ 2 K5 ;
which can be rewritten as
"
#
"
#
G X
M
G X
M X
S
X
X
ocgms ðqgms Þ
ofgm ðqm Þ


þ sgm egm  ½qgm  qgm  þ
 q1gms  ½qgms  qgms 
oq
oq
gm
gms
g¼1 m¼1
g¼1 m¼1 s¼1

ð19Þ


S
S X
K X
T  t
S X
M X
G
X
X
X
ocs ðh Þ
ocsk ðqt
t
t
t
sk Þ

½q
 ½hs  hs  þ

q

q

þ
2sk
sk
sk
ohs
oqtsk
s¼1
s¼1 k¼1 t¼1
s¼1 m¼1 g¼1
"
#

S X
K X
T
X
 t

o^cgms ðqgms Þ

þ q1gms  ½qgms  qgms  þ
q2sk þ ^ctsk ðqt
sk Þ
oqgms
s¼1 k¼1 t¼1
þ

 ½qtsk  qt
sk  

K
X

q3k ðd  Þ  ½d k  d k  P 0

8ðq; h; Q1 ; Q2 ; dÞ 2 K5 .

ð20Þ

k¼1

Clearly, (20) is the sum of the optimality conditions (4) and (14), and the equilibrium conditions (20) and is,
hence, according to Deﬁnition 1 an electric power supply chain network equilibrium. h
We now describe how to recover the prices associated with the ﬁrst and third tiers of nodes in the electric
power supply chain network. Clearly, the components of the vector q3 can be directly obtained from the solution to variational inequality (18). We now describe how to recover the prices q1gms , for all g, m, s, and qt
2sk for
all s, k, t, from the solution of variational inequality (18). The prices associated with the power suppliers can be

ctsk ðQ2 Þ for any s, t, k such that qt
obtained by setting ((16)) qt
2sk ¼ q3k  ^
sk > 0. The top-tiered prices, in turn,
can be recovered by setting ((4)) q1gms ¼

ofgm ðqm Þ
oqgms

þ sgm egm þ

ocgms ðqgms Þ
oqgms

for any g, m, s such that qgms > 0.

Nagurney and Matsypura (2004) derived a variational inequality formulation of electric power supply
chain network equilibrium in the case of known demand functions but since the conservation of ﬂow expression (7) in their model was an inequality the formulation also had Lagrange multipliers reﬂecting nodal prices
associated with those inequalities as variables in their variational inequality. Also, the models of Nagurney
and Matsypura (2004) and Nagurney and Liu (2005) did not include power plants and had no pollution
taxes for policy decision-making.
Note that the total carbon emissions generated by genco g can be obtained once variational inequality (18)
is solved.
PM We denote the total amount of carbon emitted by genco g by TEg and we have that
TEg ¼ m¼1 egm qgm . The total amount of carbon emitted by all the power generators, denoted by TE, is then:
PG
PG PM
TE ¼ g¼1 TEg ¼ g¼1 m¼1 egm qgm .
Remark. For simplicity and deﬁniteness, here we have considered the terms sgm, g = 1, . . . , G; m = 1, . . . , M,
to be pollution taxes, and, hence, their values are nonnegative. If one wishes to model a pollution credit for
production with a ‘‘clean’’ production technique (consider, for example, power production by wind farms)
then sgm would be a subsidy that takes on a negative value. The emission terms: egm, g = 1, . . . , G;
m = 1, . . . , M, would no longer be used but, instead, mathematically, these terms would be set identically
equal to one to reﬂect the fact that a clean production subsidy must be attached to output instead of emissions.
All the above results would mathematically still hold true.
3. The transportation network equilibrium model with elastic demands
In this section, we recall the transportation network equilibrium model with elastic demands, due to Dafermos (1982), in which the travel disutility functions are assumed known and given. In Section 4, we will then
establish that the electric power supply chain network model in Section 2 can be reformulated as such a transportation network equilibrium problem but over a specially constructed network topology.
3.1. Transportation network equilibrium model
We consider a network G with the set of links L with K elements, the set of paths P with Q elements, and the
set of origin/destination (O/D) pairs W with Z elements. We denote the set of paths joining O/D pair w by Pw.
Links are denoted by a, b, etc; paths by p, q, etc., and O/D pairs by w1, w2, etc.
We denote the ﬂow on path p by xp and the ﬂow on link a by fa. The user travel cost on a link a is denoted
by ca and the user travel cost on a path p by Cp. We denote the travel demand associated with traveling
between O/D pair w by dw and the travel disutility by kw.

The link ﬂows are related to the path ﬂows through the following conservation of ﬂow equations:
X
xp dap 8a 2 L;
fa ¼

ð21Þ

p2P

where dap = 1 if link a is contained in path p, and dap = 0, otherwise. Hence, the ﬂow on a link is equal to the
sum of the ﬂows on paths that contain that link.
The user costs on paths are related to user costs on links through the following equations:
X
ca dap 8p 2 P ;
ð22Þ
Cp ¼
a2L

that is, the user cost on a path is equal to the sum of user costs on links that make up the path.
For the sake of generality, we allow the user cost on a link to depend upon the entire vector of link ﬂows,
denoted by f, so that
ca ¼ ca ðf Þ

8a 2 L.

ð23Þ

We have the following conservation of ﬂow equations:
X
xp ¼ d w 8w.

ð24Þ

p2P w

Also, assume, as given, disutility functions, such that
kw ¼ kw ðdÞ

8w;

ð25Þ

where d is the vector of travel demands with travel demand associated with O/D pair w being denoted by dw.
Deﬁnition 2 (Transportation network equilibrium). In equilibrium, the following conditions must hold for
each O/D pair w 2 W and each path p 2 Pw:
(
¼ 0 if xp > 0;


C p ðx Þ  kw ðd Þ
ð26Þ
P 0 if xp ¼ 0.
The interpretation of conditions (26) is that only those paths connecting an O/D pair are used that have
minimal travel costs and those costs are equal to the travel disutility associated with traveling between that
O/D pair. As proved in Dafermos (1982), the transportation network equilibrium conditions (26) are equivalent to the following variational inequality in path ﬂows: determine ðx ; d  Þ 2 K6 such that
X
X X
C p ðx Þ  ½xp  xp  
kw ðd  Þ  ½d w  d w  P 0 8ðx; dÞ 2 K6 ;
ð27Þ
w2W p2P w

w2W

P
where K6  fðx; dÞ j ðx; dÞ 2 RKþZ
and d w ¼ p2P w xp ; 8wg.
þ
We now recall the equivalent variational inequality in link form due to Dafermos (1982).
Theorem 2. A link flow pattern and associated travel demand pattern is a transportation network equilibrium if
and only if it satisfies the variational inequality problem: determine ðf  ; d  Þ 2 K7 satisfying
X
X
ca ðf  Þ  ðfa  fa Þ 
kw ðd  Þ  ðd w  d w Þ P 0 8ðf ; dÞ 2 K7 ;
ð28Þ
a2L

w2W

where K7  fðf ; dÞ 2 RKþZ
j there exists an x satisfying (21) and d w ¼
þ

P

p2P w xp

8wg.

Beckmann et al. (1956) were the ﬁrst to formulate rigorously the transportation network equilibrium conditions (26) in the context of user link cost functions and travel disutility functions that admitted symmetric
Jacobian matrices so that the equilibrium conditions (26) coincided with the Kuhn–Tucker optimality conditions of an appropriately constructed optimization problem. The variational inequality formulation, in turn,
allows for asymmetric functions.

4. Transportation network equilibrium reformulation of the electric power supply chain network
equilibrium model
In this section, we show that the electric power supply chain network equilibrium model presented in Section 2 is isomorphic to a properly conﬁgured transportation network equilibrium model through the establishment of a supernetwork equivalence of the former.
4.1. Supernetwork equivalence of the electric power supply chain network
We now establish the supernetwork equivalence of the electric power supply chain network equilibrium
model to the transportation network equilibrium model with known travel disutility functions described in
Section 3. This transformation allows us, as we will demonstrate in Section 5, to apply algorithms developed
for the latter class of problems to solve the former.
Consider an electric power supply chain network with power plants as discussed in Section 2 with given
power generators: g = 1, . . . , G; given power plants for each power generator: m = 1, . . . , M; power suppliers:
s = 1, . . . , S; transmission service providers: t = 1, . . . , T, and demand markets: k = 1, . . . , K. The supernetwork, GS , of the isomorphic transportation network equilibrium model is depicted in Fig. 2 and is constructed
as follows.
It consists of six tiers of nodes with the origin node 0 at the top or ﬁrst tier and the destination nodes at the
sixth or bottom tier. Speciﬁcally, GS consists of a single origin node 0 at the ﬁrst tier, and K destination nodes
at the bottom tier, denoted, respectively, by: z1, . . . , zK. There are K O/D pairs in GS denoted by w1 =
(0, z1), . . . , wk = (0, zk), . . . , wK = (0, zK). Node 0 is connected to each second tiered node xg, g = 1, . . . , G,

Fig. 2. The GS supernetwork representation of electric power network equilibrium.

by a single link. Each second tiered node xg, in turn, is connected to each third tiered node xgm, g = 1, . . . , G;
m = 1, . . . , M, by a single link, and each third tiered node is then connected to each fourth-tiered node ys,
s = 1, . . . , S, by a single link. Each fourth tiered node ys is connected to the corresponding ﬁfth tiered node
y s0 by a single link. Finally, each ﬁfth tiered node y s0 is connected to each destination node zk, k = 1, . . . , K,
at the sixth tier by T parallel links.
Hence, in GS , there are G + GM + 2S + K + 1 nodes; G + GM + GMS + S + STK links, K O/D pairs, and
GMSTK paths. We now deﬁne the link and link ﬂow notation. Let ag denote the link from node 0 to node xg
with associated link ﬂow fag , for g = 1, . . . , G. Let agm denote the link from node xg to node xgm with link ﬂow
fagm for g = 1, . . . , G; m = 1, . . . , M. Also, let agms denote the link from node xgm to node ys with associated
link ﬂow fagms for g = 1, . . . , G, m = 1, . . . , M, and s = 1, . . . , S. Let ass0 denote the link connecting node ys with
node y s0 with associated link ﬂow fass0 for s; s prime = 1, . . . , S. Finally, let ats0 k denote the t-th link joining node
y s0 with node zk for s 0 = 1 0 , . . . , S 0 , t = 1, . . . , T, and k = 1, . . . , K and with associated link ﬂow fat 0 .
sk
We group the link ﬂows into the vectors as follows: we group the ffag g into the vector f 1; the ffagm g into the
vector f 2, the ffagms g into the vector f3; the ffass0 g into the vector f 4, and the ffat 0 g into the vector f 5.
sk
Thus, a typical path connecting O/D pair wk = (0, zk), is denoted by ptgmss0 k and consists of ﬁve links:
ag ; agm ; agms ; ass0 , and ats0 k . The associated ﬂow on the path is denoted by xpt 0 . Finally, we let d wk be the demand
gmss k
associated with O/D pair wk where kwk denotes the travel disutility for wk.
Note that the following conservation of ﬂow equations must hold on the network GS :
M X
S X
S0 X
K X
T
X

fag ¼

m¼1 s¼1 s0 ¼1 k¼1
S X
S0 X
K X
T
X

fagm ¼

s¼1 s0 ¼1 k¼1

fagms ¼

s0 ¼1 k¼1

fass0 ¼
fat 0 ¼
sk

gmss0 k

G X
M X
K X
T
X
g¼1 m¼1 k¼1
G X
M X
S
X
g¼1 m¼1 s¼1

gmss0 k

xp t

t¼1

gmss0 k

;

g ¼ 1; . . . ; G;

g ¼ 1; . . . ; G; m ¼ 1; . . . ; M;

;

g ¼ 1; . . . ; G; m ¼ 1; . . . ; M; s ¼ 1; . . . ; S;

;

xp t

gmss0 k

t¼1

xp t

gmss0 k

xpt

t¼1

S0 X
K X
T
X

xp t

t¼1

s ¼ 1; . . . ; S; s0 ¼ 1; . . . ; S 0 ;

;

s0 ¼ 1; . . . ; S 0 ; t ¼ 1; . . . ; T ; k ¼ 1; . . . ; K.

;

ð29Þ
ð30Þ
ð31Þ
ð32Þ
ð33Þ

Also, we have that
d wk ¼

G X
M X
S X
S0 X
T
X

xp t

gmss0 k

g¼1 m¼1 s¼1 s0 ¼1 t¼1

;

k ¼ 1; . . . ; K.

ð34Þ

If all path ﬂows are nonnegative and (29)–(34) are satisﬁed, the feasible path ﬂow pattern induces a feasible
link ﬂow pattern.
We can construct a feasible link ﬂow pattern for GS based on the corresponding feasible electric power supply chain ﬂow pattern in the electric power supply chain network model, ðq; h; Q1 ; Q2 ; dÞ 2 K5 , thus:
qg  fag ;

g ¼ 1; . . . ; G;

qgm  fagm ;

g ¼ 1; . . . ; G; m ¼ 1; . . . ; M;

qgms  fagms ;
hs  fass0 ;
qtsk

g ¼ 1; . . . ; G; m ¼ 1; . . . ; M; s ¼ 1; . . . ; S;
0

s ¼ 1; . . . ; S; s ¼ 1 ; . . . ; S ;
0

0

0

s ¼ 1; . . . ; S; s ¼ 1 ; . . . ; S ; t ¼ 1; . . . ; T ; k ¼ 1; . . . ; K;

sk

S X
T
X
s¼1

0

0

¼ fat 0 ;

dk ¼

ð35Þ

t¼1

qtsk ;

k ¼ 1; . . . ; K.

ð36Þ
ð37Þ
ð38Þ
ð39Þ
ð40Þ

Observe that although qg is not explicitly stated in the model in Section 2, it is inferred in that
qg ¼

M
X

qgm ;

g ¼ 1; . . . ; G;

ð41Þ

m¼1

and simply represents the total electric power produced by genco g.
Note that if (q, Q1, h, Q2, d) is feasible then the link ﬂow and demand pattern constructed according to
(35)–(40) is also feasible and the corresponding path ﬂow pattern which induces this link ﬂow (and demand)
pattern is also feasible.
We now assign user (travel) costs on the links of the network GS as follows: with each link ag we assign a
user cost cag deﬁned by
cag  0; g ¼ 1; . . . ; G;
ofgm
þ sgm egm ; g ¼ 1; . . . ; G; m ¼ 1; . . . ; M;
cagm 
oqgm

ð42Þ
ð43Þ

with each link agms we assign a user cost cagms deﬁned by
cagms 

ocgms o^cgms
þ
;
oqgms oqgms

g ¼ 1; . . . ; G; m ¼ 1; . . . ; M; s ¼ 1; . . . ; S;

ð44Þ

with each link ss 0 we assign a user cost deﬁned by
cass0 

ocs
;
ohs

s ¼ 1; . . . ; S; s0 ¼ 1; . . . ; S 0 .

ð45Þ

Finally, for each link ats0 k we assign a user cost deﬁned by
cat 0 
sk

octsk
þ ^ctsk ;
oqtsk

s ¼ 1; . . . ; S; s0 ¼ 1; . . . ; S 0 ; t ¼ 1; . . . ; T ; k ¼ 1; . . . ; K.

ð46Þ

Then a user of path ptgmss0 k , for g = 1, . . . , G; m = 1, . . . , M; s = 1, . . . , S; s 0 = 1 0 , . . . , S 0 ; t = 1, . . . , T;
k = 1, . . . , K, on network GS in Fig. 2 experiences a path travel cost C pt 0 given by
gmss k

C pt

gmss0 k

¼ cag þ cagm þ cagms þ cass0 þ cat 0

sk

ofgm
ocgms o^cgms ocs octsk
¼
þ sgm egm þ
þ
þ
þ
þ ^ctsk .
oqgm
oqgms oqgms ohs oqtsk

ð47Þ

Also, we assign the (travel) demands associated with the O/D pairs as follows:
d wk  d k ;

k ¼ 1; . . . ; K;

ð48Þ

and the (travel) disutilities:
kwk  q3k ;

k ¼ 1; . . . ; K.

ð49Þ

Consequently, the equilibrium conditions (26) for the transportation network equilibrium model on the network GS state that for every O/D pair wk and every path connecting the O/D pair wk:
8
< ¼ 0 if xpt 0 > 0;
ofgm
ocgms o^cgms ocs octsk
gmss k
t
ð50Þ
C p t 0  kw k ¼
þ sgm egm þ
þ
þ
þ
þ ^csk  kwk
gmss k
: P 0 if xpt
¼ 0.
oqgm
oqgms oqgms ohs oqtsk
gmss0 k

We now show that the variational inequality formulation of the equilibrium conditions (50) in link form as
in (28) is equivalent to the variational inequality (18) governing the electric power supply chain network equilibrium. For the transportation network equilibrium problem on GS , according to Theorem 2, we have that a
link ﬂow and travel disutility pattern ðf  ; d  Þ 2 K7 is an equilibrium (according to (50)), if and only if it satisﬁes the variational inequality:

G
X

cag ðf 1 Þ  ðfag  fag Þ þ

g¼1

G X
M
X

cagm ðf 2 Þ  ðfagm  fagm Þ þ

g¼1 m¼1
S0

þ

S X
X
s¼1 s0 ¼1



K
X

G X
M X
S
X

cagms ðf 3 Þ  ðfagms  fagms Þ

g¼1 m¼1 s¼1
S0

cass0 ðf 4 Þ  ðfass0  fass0 Þ þ

K X
T
XX
s0 ¼1 k¼1

t¼1

cat 0 ðf 5 Þ  ðfat 0  fat 0 Þ
sk

sk

kwk ðd  Þ  ðd wk  d wk Þ P 0 8ðf ; dÞ 2 K7 .

sk

ð51Þ

k¼1

After the substitution of (35)–(46) and (48)–(49) into (51), we have the following variational inequality: determine ðq ; h ; Q1 ; Q2 ; d  Þ 2 K5 satisfying:
"
#
G X
M
S
G X
M
X
X
X
ofgm ðqm Þ
ocs ðh Þ
þ sgm egm  ½qgm  qgm  þ
 ½hs  hs  þ
oqgm
ohs
g¼1 m¼1
s¼1
g¼1 m¼1
"
#


S
S X
K X
T
X
X
ocgms ðqgms Þ o^cgms ðqgms Þ
octsk ðqt
2

t
sk Þ

þ
þ ^csk ðQ Þ
 ½qgms  qgms  þ
oqgms
oqgms
oqtsk
s¼1
s¼1 k¼1 t¼1
 ½qtsk  qt
sk  

K
X

q3k ðd  Þ  ½d k  d k  P 0

8ðq; h; Q1 ; Q2 ; dÞ 2 K5 .

ð52Þ

k¼1

Variational inequality (52) is precisely variational inequality (18) governing the electric power supply chain
network equilibrium. Hence, we have the following result:




Theorem 3. A solution ðq ; h ; Q1 ; Q2 ; d  Þ 2 K5 of the variational inequality (18) governing the electric power
supply chain network equilibrium coincides with the (via (35)–(46) and (48)–(49) feasible link flow and travel
demand pattern for the supernetwork GS constructed above and satisfies variational inequality (51). Hence, it is a
transportation network equilibrium according to Theorem 2.
We now discuss the interpretation of the electric power supply chain network equilibrium conditions. These
conditions deﬁne the electric power supply network equilibrium in terms of paths and path ﬂows, which, as
shown above, coincide with Wardrop’s (1952) ﬁrst principle of user-optimization in the context of transportation networks over the network given in Fig. 2. Hence, we now have an entirely new interpretation of electric
power supply network equilibrium which states that only minimal cost paths will be used from the super
source node 0 to any destination node. Moreover, the cost on the utilized paths for a particular O/D pair
is equal to the disutility (or the demand market price) that the users are willing to pay. This interpretation also
implies a type of eﬃciency principle regarding electric power network operation and utilization, which was
ﬁrst noted by Nagurney and Liu (2005) but in much simpler electric power supply chain network models without power plants and pollution taxes.
In Section 5, we will show how Theorem 3 can be utilized to exploit algorithmically the theoretical results
obtained above when we compute the equilibrium patterns of numerical electric power supply chain network
examples using an algorithm previously used for the computation of elastic demand transportation network
equilibria. Of course, existence and uniqueness results obtained for elastic demand transportation network equilibrium models as in Dafermos (1982) as well as stability and sensitivity analysis results (Nagurney
and Zhang, 1996) can now be transferred to electric power networks using the formalism/equivalence established above.
It is important to emphasize that the connection formalized above between electric power supply chain
networks and transportation networks also unveils opportunities for further modeling enhancements. For
example, one may construct network representations of actual power grids and substitute these for the
corresponding transmission links in the supernetwork. The concept of equilibrium path ﬂows would still be
appropriate and relevant but with the supernetwork expanded accordingly. For example, an analogous extension but in the case of spatial price network equilibrium problems can be found in Dafermos and Nagurney
(1984).

5. Computations
In this section, we provide numerical examples to demonstrate how the theoretical results in this paper
can be applied in practice. We utilize the Euler method for our numerical computations. The Euler method
is induced by the general iterative scheme of Dupuis and Nagurney (1993) and has been applied by Nagurney and Zhang (1996) to solve variational inequality (27) in path ﬂows (equivalently, variational inequality
(28) in link ﬂows) (Zhang and Nagurney, 1997). Convergence results can be found in the above references.
5.1. The Euler method
For the solution of (27), the Euler method takes the form: at iteration s compute the path ﬂows for paths
p 2 P (and the travel demands) according to
¼ maxf0; xsp þ as ðkw ðd s Þ  C p ðxs ÞÞg.
xsþ1
p

ð53Þ

The simplicity of (53) lies in the explicit formula that allows for the computation of the path ﬂows in closed
form at each iteration. The demands at each iteration simply satisfy (24) and this expression can be substituted
into the kw(Æ) functions.
The Euler method was implemented in FORTRAN and the computer system used was a Sun system at the
University of Massachusetts at Amherst. The convergence criterion utilized was that the absolute value of the
4
path ﬂows between two successive
 1 1 1 iterations
 diﬀered by no more than 10 . The sequence {as} in the Euler
1 1
method ((53)) was set to: 1; 2 ; 2 ; 3 ; 3 ; 3 ; . . . . The Euler method was initialized by setting the demands equal
to 100 for each O/D pair with the path ﬂows equally distributed.
In all the numerical examples, the electric power supply chain network consisted of two power generators,
with two power plants each, two power suppliers, one transmission provider, and two demand markets as
depicted in Fig. 3. The supernetwork representation which allows for the transformation (as proved in Section
4) to a transportation network equilibrium problem is given also in Fig. 3. Hence, in the numerical examples
(see also Fig. 2) we had that: G = 2, M = 2, S = 2, S 0 = 2 0 , K = 2, and T = 1.
The notation is presented here and in the subsequent examples in the form of the electric power supply
chain network equilibrium model of Section 2. We then provide the translations of the equilibrium link ﬂows,
and the travel demands (and disutilities) into the equilibrium electric power supply chain ﬂows and prices.

Fig. 3. Electric power network and corresponding supernetwork GS for the numerical examples.

Example 1. The data for the ﬁrst numerical example is given below. In order to construct a benchmark, we
assumed that none of the gencos’ power plants were polluting and that, hence, all the terms: egm, g = 1, 2;
m = 1, 2, were equal to zero. Hence, we did not impose any taxes.
The power generating cost functions for the power generators were given by
f11 ðq1 Þ ¼ 2:5q211 þ q11 q21 þ 2q11 ;

f 12 ðq2 Þ ¼ 2:5q212 þ q11 q12 þ 2q22 ;

f 21 ðq1 Þ ¼ .5q221 þ .5q11 q21 þ 2q21 ;

f22 ðq2 Þ ¼ .5q222 þ q12 q22 þ 2q22 .
The transaction cost functions faced by the power generators and associated with transacting with the
power suppliers were given by
c111 ðq111 Þ ¼ .5q2111 þ 3:5q111 ;

c112 ðq112 Þ ¼ .5q2112 þ 3:5q112 ;

c121 ðq121 Þ ¼ .5q2121 þ 3:5q121 ;

c122 ðq122 Þ ¼ .5q2122 þ 3:5q122 ;
c211 ðq211 Þ ¼ .5q2211 þ 2q211 ;

c212 ðq212 Þ ¼ .5q2212 þ 2q212 ;

c221 ðq221 Þ ¼ .5q2221 þ 2q221 ;

c222 ðq222 Þ ¼ .5q2222 þ 2q222 .
The operating costs of the power generators, in turn, were given by
!2
!2
2
2
X
X
1
1
c1 ðQ Þ ¼ .5
qi1 ; c2 ðQ Þ ¼ .5
qi2 .
i¼1

i¼1

The demand market price functions at the demand markets were
q31 ðdÞ ¼ 1:33d 1 þ 366:6;

q32 ¼ 1:33d 2 þ 366:6;

and the transaction costs between the power suppliers and the consumers at the demand markets were given
by
^c1sk ðq1sk Þ ¼ q1sk þ 5;

s ¼ 1; 2; k ¼ 1; 2.

All other transaction costs were assumed to be equal to zero.
We utilized the supernetwork representation of this example depicted in Fig. 3 with the links enumerated as
in Fig. 3 in order to solve the problem via the Euler method. Note that there are 13 nodes and 20 links in the
supernetwork in Fig. 3. Using the procedure outlined in Section 4, we deﬁned O/D pair w1 = (0, z1) and O/D
pair w2 = (0, z2) and we associated the O/D pair travel disutilities with the demand market price functions as
in (49) and the user link travel cost functions as given in (42)–(46) (analogous constructions were done for the
subsequent examples).
The Euler method converged in 67 iterations and yielded the equilibrium link ﬂows (also the supernetwork
in Fig. 3):
fa1 ¼ 32:53;

fa2 ¼ 115:22;

fa11 ¼ 22:57;

fa12 ¼ 9:96;

fa21 ¼ 22:90;

fa22 ¼ 92:32;

fa110 ¼ fa220 ¼ 73:87;
fa111 ¼ 11:29;

fa112 ¼ 11:29;

fa121 ¼ 4:98;

fa211 ¼ 11:45;

fa212 ¼ 11:45;

fa221 ¼ 46:16;

fa122 ¼ 4:98;
fa222 ¼ 46:16;

fa1 ¼ fa1 ¼ fa1 ¼ fa1 ¼ 36:94;
10 1

10 2

20 1

20 2

and the following travel demands: d w1 ¼ 73:88; d w2 ¼ 73:88.
The incurred travel disutilities were kw1 ¼ kw2 ¼ 268:36. We do not report the path ﬂows due to space limitations (there are eight paths connecting each O/D pair) but note that all paths connecting each O/D pair
were used, that is, had positive ﬂow and the travel costs for paths connecting each O/D pair were equal to
the travel disutility for that O/D pair.

We now provide the translations of the above equilibrium ﬂows into the electric power supply chain network ﬂow and price notation using (40)–(43) and (45)–(49).
The electric power supply chain network ﬂows were
q1 ¼ 32:53;

q2 ¼ 115:22;

q11 ¼ 22:57;

q12 ¼ 9:96;

q21 ¼ 22:90;

q22 ¼ 9:96;

h1 ¼ h2 ¼ 73:87;
q111 ¼ 11:29;

q112 ¼ 11:29;

q121 ¼ 4:98;

q122 ¼ 4:98;

q211 ¼ 11:45;

q212 ¼ 11:45;

q221 ¼ 46:16;

q222 ¼ 46:16;

1
1
1
q1
10 1 ¼ q10 2 ¼ q20 1 ¼ q20 2 ¼ 36:94.

The demand prices at the demand markets were q31 = q32 = 268.36 and the demands were d 1 ¼ d 2 ¼ 73:88.
The optimality/equilibrium conditions were satisﬁed with excellent accuracy.
Since we assumed that egm = 0, g = 1, 2; m = 1, 2, the total carbon emissions: TE = 0.
Example 2. We then solved a variant of Example 1. We kept the data identical to that in Example 1 except
that we considered power plant 1 of genco 1 to be polluting with e11 = 1. Our goal was to identify a tax high
enough so that the polluting power plant would not produce at all, which means that the corresponding
equilibrium link ﬂow would be zero. By setting s11 = 133 (determined through simulations) we obtained that
fa11 ¼ 0, which means that this pollution tax was sufﬁciently high enough that the genco did not use the
polluting plant at all.
The Euler method converged in 65 iterations and yielded the following equilibrium link ﬂows (Fig. 3):
fa1 ¼ 10:77;

fa2 ¼ 128:71;

fa11 ¼ 0:00;

fa12 ¼ 10:77;

fa21 ¼ 29:14;

fa22 ¼ 99:58;

fa121 ¼ 5:38;

fa122 ¼ 5:38;

fa110 ¼ fa220 ¼ 69:74;
fa111 ¼ 0:00;
fa211 ¼ 14:57;

fa112 ¼ 0:00;
fa212 ¼ 14:57;

fa221 ¼ 49:79;

fa222 ¼ 49:79;

fa1 ¼ fa1 ¼ fa1 ¼ fa1 ¼ 34:87;
10 1

10 2

20 1

20 2

and the following travel demands: d w1 ¼ d w2 ¼ 69:74.
The incurred travel disutilities were kw1 ¼ kw2 ¼ 273:85 and the equilibrium demands were
d w1 ¼ d w2 ¼ 69:74.
Although we do not report the equilibrium path ﬂows, due to space constraints, we note that, in this example, two paths connecting each O/D pair were not used; in other words, they had ﬂows of zero on them.
For completeness, we provide the translations of the above equilibrium ﬂows into the electric power supply
chain network ﬂow and price notation using (40)–(43) and (45)–(49).
The electric power supply chain network ﬂows were
q1 ¼ 10:77;

q2 ¼ 128:71;

q11 ¼ 0:00;

q12 ¼ 10:77;

q21 ¼ 29:14;

q22 ¼ 99:58;

q121 ¼ 5:38;

q122 ¼ 5:38;

h1 ¼ h2 ¼ 69:74;
q111 ¼ 0:00;
q211 ¼ 11:45;

q112 ¼ 0:00;
q212 ¼ 14:57;

q221 ¼ 49:79;

q222 ¼ 49:79;

1
1
1
q1
10 1 ¼ q10 2 ¼ q20 1 ¼ q20 2 ¼ 34:87.

The demand prices at the demand markets were q31 = q32 = 273.85 and the demands were d 1 ¼ d 2 ¼ 69:74.
Note that, with the imposition of the pollution tax, the demand for electric power was reduced and the price
of electric power increased.

K. Wu et al. / Transportation Research Part D 11 (2006) 171–190

187

The total emissions generated were due to the ﬁrst power plant of the ﬁrst genco with TE1 ¼ e11 q11 ¼ 0. We
note that if no carbon tax had been imposed then TE1 = 22.57, and the demand would have been equal to
73.88 and the demand market price to 268.36 at each of the two demand markets.
Example 3. Example 3 was constructed from Example 2. The data were identical to the data in Example 2,
except that we now assumed that the ﬁrst power plant of genco 2 was also polluting with e21 = 1. We imposed
the same tax on the ﬁrst power plant of the second genco as we had for power plant 1 of genco 1. Hence, in this
example, all taxes were equal to zero except that s11 = s21 = 133.
The Euler method converged in 67 iterations and yielded the following new equilibrium pattern: The computed equilibrium link ﬂows were now:
fa1 ¼ 17:42;

fa2 ¼ 113:36;

fa11 ¼ 5:80;

fa12 ¼ 11:61;

fa21 ¼ 6:14;

fa22 ¼ 107:22;
fa122 ¼ 5:81;

fa110 ¼ fa220 ¼ 65:39;
fa111 ¼ 2:90;

fa112 ¼ 2:90;

fa121 ¼ 5:81;

fa211 ¼ 3:07;

fa212 ¼ 3:07;

fa221 ¼ 53:61;

fa222 ¼ 53:61;

fa1 ¼ fa1 ¼ fa1 ¼ fa1 ¼ 32:69;
10 1

10 2

20 1

20 2

and the following travel demands: d w1 ¼ d w2 ¼ 65:39. The incurred travel disutilities were kw1 ¼ kw2 ¼ 279:63.
In this example (as in Example 1), all paths connecting each O/D pair were used, that is, they had positive
equilibrium ﬂows.
The electric power supply chain network ﬂows/transactions were
q1 ¼ 17:42;

q2 ¼ 113:36;

q11 ¼ 5:80;

q12 ¼ 11:61;

q21 ¼ 6:14;

q22 ¼ 107:22;

h1 ¼ h2 ¼ 65:39;
q111 ¼ 2:90;

q112 ¼ 2:90;

q121 ¼ 5:81;

q211 ¼ 3:07;

q212 ¼ 3:07;

q221 ¼ 53:61;

q122 ¼ 5:81;
q222 ¼ 53:61;

1
1
1
q1
10 1 ¼ q10 2 ¼ q20 1 ¼ q20 2 ¼ 32:69.

The demand prices at the demand markets were q31 = q32 = 279.63, with demands of d 1 ¼ d 2 ¼ 65:39.
The imposition of the same tax on the polluting power plants of both power generators had the eﬀect that
both these power plants produced electric power. In Example 2, in contrast, the imposition of a single tax
resulted in no production at the polluting power plant, whereas keeping that tax and imposing the same
tax also on another power plant resulted in production in the former plant. However, the polluting power
plant of genco 2 did reduce its production substantially in plant 1 as compared to what it produced there
in Example 2. The demand market prices at the two demand markets were now higher than in Example 2
and the demand for electric power was lower in both demand markets (due to the higher prices as a consequence of the pollution taxes). The total pollution generated was: TE = TE1 + TE2 = 5.80 + 6.14 = 11.94.
Notice that the total amount of carbon emitted, relative to the amount emitted in Example 2, was essentially
reduced by 50%.
Example 4. In Example 4, we then set out to ask the question, what would be the eﬀects of imposing the same
tax on all the genco/power plants, assuming that egm = 1 for g = 1,2; m = 1,2. In this example, we set
sgm = 133 for g = 1,2 and m = 1,2.
The Euler method converged in 65 iterations. The computed equilibrium link ﬂows were now:
fa1 ¼ 20:24;

fa2 ¼ 72:50;

fa11 ¼ 14:09;

fa12 ¼ 6:15;

fa21 ¼ 14:42;

fa22 ¼ 58:05;

fa110 ¼ fa220 ¼ 46:37;
fa111 ¼ 7:04;

fa112 ¼ 7:04;

fa121 ¼ 3:08;

fa211 ¼ 7:21;

fa212 ¼ 7:21;

fa221 ¼ 29:04;

fa122 ¼ 3:08;
fa222 ¼ 29:04;

fa1 ¼ fa1 ¼ fa1 ¼ fa1 ¼ 23:18;
10 1

10 2

20 1

20 2

and the following travel demands:
d w1 ¼ d w2 ¼ 46:37.
The incurred travel disutilities were kw1 ¼ kw2 ¼ 304:93.
In this example, all paths (as in Examples 1 and 3) were used in equilibrium, that is, they had positive ﬂows.
The electric power supply chain network ﬂows/transactions were
q1 ¼ 20:24; q2 ¼ 72:50;
q11 ¼ 14:09; q12 ¼ 6:15;
h1 ¼ h2 ¼ 46:37;
q111 ¼ 7:04; q112 ¼ 7:04;
q211 ¼ 7:21; q212 ¼ 7:21;

q21 ¼ 14:42;

q22 ¼ 58:05;

q121 ¼ 3:08; q122 ¼ 3:08;
q221 ¼ 29:04; q222 ¼ 29:04;

1
1
1
q1
10 1 ¼ q10 2 ¼ q20 1 ¼ q20 2 ¼ 23:18.

The demand prices at the demand markets were
q31 ¼ q32 ¼ 304:93;
and the demands for electric power were now: d 1 ¼ d 2 ¼ 46:37.
The imposition of a pollution tax on all the power plants results in a substantial increase in demand market
prices and a decrease in demand for electric power.
The total amount of emissions: TE = TE1 + TE2 = 92.71, where TE1 = 14.09 + 6.15 = 20.24 and
TE2 = 14.42 + 58.05 = 72.47. If we had not imposed the taxes, the total amount of emissions would have been
147.23 and the demand would have been 73.88 and the demand market price would have been equal to 268.36
at each demand market.
Example 5. In Example 5, our goal was to identify how high the taxes should be on the ﬁrst (assumed to be
polluting) power plants of each generator so that neither high-polluting power plant would be used. In
Example 3, if we imposed taxes: s11 = s21 = 133, then the ﬁrst power plant of each genco was still producing.
We, hence, conducted the following simulation: we increased the taxes from 133 for both those power plants
(thus, we used as the baseline Example 3) until we achieved zero production at those power plants. Taxes of
s11 = s21 = 188 yielded the desired policy result that there was zero production at the noxious power plants.
The complete equilibrium solution is now reported. The Euler method converged in 62 iterations and
yielded the following equilibrium solution: The computed equilibrium link ﬂows were now:
fa1 ¼ 12:20;

fa2 ¼ 112:53;

fa11 ¼ 0:00;

fa12 ¼ 12:20;

fa21 ¼ 0:00;

fa22 ¼ 112:53;
fa122 ¼ 6:10;

fa110 ¼ fa220 ¼ 62:37;
fa111 ¼ 0:00;

fa112 ¼ 0:00;

fa121 ¼ 6:10;

fa211 ¼ 0:00;

fa212 ¼ 0:00;

fa221 ¼ 56:26;

fa222 ¼ 56:26;

fa1 ¼ fa1 ¼ fa1 ¼ fa1 ¼ 31:18;
10 1

10 2

20 1

20 2

and the following travel demands:
d w1 ¼ d w2 ¼ 62:37.
The incurred travel disutilities were kw1 ¼ kw2 ¼ 283:60.

In this example, four paths (that is, half of the paths) connecting each O/D pair had zero ﬂow in equilibrium (and, hence, were not used) and this is because their path travel costs exceeded the equilibrium path costs
of the used paths (and the travel disutilities for the respective O/D pair).
The electric power ﬂows/transactions were
q1 ¼ 12:20;

q2 ¼ 112:53;

q11 ¼ 0:00;

q12 ¼ 12:20;

q21 ¼ 0:00;

q22 ¼ 112:53;

h1 ¼ h2 ¼ 62:37;
q111 ¼ 0:00;

q112 ¼ 0:00;

q121 ¼ 6:10;

q211 ¼ 0:00;

q212 ¼ 0:00;

q221 ¼ 56:26;

q122 ¼ 6:10;
q222 ¼ 56:26;

1
1
1
q1
10 1 ¼ q10 2 ¼ q20 1 ¼ q20 2 ¼ 31:18.

The demand prices at the demand markets were q31 = q32 = 283.60, with demands of d 1 ¼ d 2 ¼ 62:37.
The numerical examples illustrate some of the types of simulations that can be conducted in order to investigate the ramiﬁcation of the imposition of pollution taxes.
6. Conclusions
In this paper, we proposed a new model of electric power supply chain networks with distinct power plants,
which allows for distinct fuels. The model also includes carbon pollution taxes that can be imposed on the
various power generator/power plant combinations. We derived the optimality conditions of the decisionmakers and proved that the governing equilibrium conditions satisfy a variational inequality problem. We
then demonstrated that the electric power supply chain network equilibrium problem can be reformulated
as a transportation network equilibrium problem with elastic demands over an appropriately constructed
abstract network or supernetwork (see also Boyce et al. (2005)).
Speciﬁcally, we utilized variational inequality theory to establish the equivalence between the electric power
supply chain network equilibrium problem in which there are multiple power plants associated with each
power generator (or genco) with assigned pollution taxes and a transportation network equilibrium problem
with elastic demands over a specially-constructed supernetwork. The theoretical results established in this
paper were then exploited in the computation of electric power supply chain numerical examples with distinct
pollution taxes which were solved as reformulated transportation network equilibrium problems. The numerical examples illustrate the ﬂexibility of assigning taxes in achieving such desired outcomes as zero production
in the highest polluting power plants. This paper further conﬁrms a hypothesis of Beckmann et al. (1956) that
electric power generation and distribution networks are related to transportation network equilibrium problems; see also McGuire (1997, 1999). For the analogous equivalence, but for multitiered supply chain network
problems, see Nagurney (in press).
Acknowledgements
This research of the second and third authors was supported, in part, by NSF Grant No. IIS 00026471. The
research of the second author was also supported, in part, by the Radcliﬀe Institute for Advanced Study at
Harvard University under its 2005–2006 Radcliﬀe Fellows Program. This support is gratefully acknowledged
and appreciated. The authors would like to sincerely thank the anonymous reviewer for very helpful comments and suggestions on an earlier version of this paper.
References
Baranzini, A., Goldemberg, J., Speck, S., 2000. A future for carbon taxes. Ecological Economics 32, 395–412.
Bazaraa, M.S., Sherali, H.D., Shetty, C.M., 1993. Nonlinear Programming: Theory and Algorithms. John Wiley & Sons, New York.
Beckmann, M.J., McGuire, C.B., Winsten, C.B., 1956. Studies in the Economics of Transportation. Yale University Press, New Haven.
Bertsekas, D.P., Tsitsiklis, J.N., 1989. Parallel and Distributed Computation—Numerical Methods. Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliﬀs, NJ.

Boyce, D.E., Mahmassani, H.S., Nagurney, A., 2005. A retrospective on Beckmann, McGuire, and Winsten’s studies in the economics of
transportation. Papers in Regional Science 84, 85–103.
Casazza, J., Delea, F., 2003. Understanding Electric Power Systems. John Wiley & Sons, New York.
Cline, W.R., 1992. The economics of global warming. Institute for International Economics, Washington, DC.
Dafermos, S., 1982. The general multimodal network equilibrium problem with elastic demand. Networks 12, 57–72.
Dafermos, S., Nagurney, A., 1984. Sensitivity analysis for the general spatial economic equilibrium problem. Operations Research 32,
1069–1086.
Dafermos, S., Nagurney, A., 1987. Oligopolistic and competitive behavior of spatially separated markets. Regional Science and Urban
Economics 17, 245–254.
Dupuis, P., Nagurney, A., 1993. Dynamical systems and variational inequalities. Annals of Operations Research 44, 9–42.
Edison Electric Institute, 2000. Statistical yearbook of the electric utility industry 1999, Washington, DC.
Energy Information Administration, 2000. Electric power annual 1999, vol. II, DOE/EIA-0348 (99)/2, Washington, DC.
Energy Information Administration, 2005. Annual energy review 2004, DOE/EIA-0348 (2000), Washington, DC.
Gabay, D., Moulin, H., 1980. On the uniqueness and stability of Nash equilibria in noncooperative games. In: Bensoussan, A.,
Kleindorfer, P., Tapiero, C.S. (Eds.), Applied Stochastic Control in Econometrics and Management Science. North-Holland,
Amsterdam.
McGuire, B., 1997. Price Driven Coordination in a Lossy Power GridPWP-045. California Energy Institute, Berkeley.
McGuire, B., 1999. Power-Grid Decentralization. California Energy Institute, Berkeley, PWP-061.
Nagurney, A., 1993. Network Economics: A Variational Inequality Approach. Kluwer, Dordrecht.
Nagurney, A., in press. On the relationship between supply chain and transportation network equilibria: a supernetwork equivalence with
computations. Transportation Research E.
Nagurney, A., Dong, J., Zhang, D., 2002. A supply chain network equilibrium model. Transportation Research E 38, 281–303.
Nagurney, A., Liu, Z., 2005. Transportation Network Equilibrium Reformulations of Electric Power Networks with Computations.
Isenberg School of Management, University of Massachusetts, Amherst. Available from: http://supernet.som.umass.edu.
Nagurney, A., Matsypura, D., 2004. A supply chain network perspective for electric power generation, supply, transmission, and
consumption. In: Proceedings of the International Conference on Computing, Communications and Control Technologies, vol.
VI, Austin, Texas, pp. 127–134.
Nagurney, A., Toyasaki, F., 2003. Supply chain supernetworks and environmental criteria. Transportation Research D 8, 185–213.
Nagurney, A., Zhang, D., 1996. Projected Dynamical Systems and Variational Inequalities with Applications. Kluwer, Boston.
Nash, J.F., 1950. Equilibrium points in n-person games. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 36, 48–49.
Nash, J.F., 1951. Noncooperative games. Annals of Mathematics 54, 286–298.
Painuly, J.P., 2001. Barriers to renewable energy penetration; a framework for analysis. Renewable Energy 24, 73–89.
Poterba, J., 1993. Global warming policy: a public ﬁnance perspective. Journal of Economic Perspectives 7, 73–89.
RECS, 1999. Renewable energy certiﬁcate system, <http://www.recs.org>.
Schaeﬀer, G.J., Boots, M.G., Martens, J.W., Voogt, M.H., 1999. Tradable green certiﬁcates: a new market-based incentive scheme for
renewable energy. Energy Research Centre of the Netherlands (ECN) Report, ECN-I–99-004.
Singh, H. (Ed.), 1999. IEEE Tutorial on Game Theory Applications in Power Systems. IEEE.
Wardrop, J.G., 1952. Some theoretical aspects of road traﬃc research. In: Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engineers, Part II,
pp. 325–378.
Zaccour, G. (Ed.), 1998. Deregulation of Electric Utilities. Kluwer, Boston.
Zhang, D., Nagurney, A., 1997. Formulation, stability, and computation of traﬃc network equilibria as projected dynamical systems.
Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications 93, 417–444.

